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IT’S MY CHURCH AND
I CAN RETALIATE IF I WANT TO:
HOSANNA-TABOR AND
THE FUTURE OF THE
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
BRAD TURNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world in which a parochial school teacher can be fired
for reporting the sexual abuse of a child to the government. Now
imagine that teacher cannot seek legal recourse because a so-called
“ministerial exception” immunizes religious employers against
lawsuits brought by their employees. Depending on how the Supreme
Court rules in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
1
School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, that
hypothetical world could become ours.
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court will consider the
applicability of antidiscrimination laws to religious organizations.
More precisely, the Court will consider whether the ministerial
exception
bars
parochial
school
teachers
from
filing
antidiscrimination suits against their religious employers, even when
their teaching duties are not functionally different from those of lay
employees. Hosanna-Tabor thus implicates a complicated and
conflicting set of constitutional interests. On the one hand, teachers
have a constitutional right to be free from invidious discrimination.
On the other, parochial schools have a right to the free exercise of
their religion. Furthermore, Congress and the courts must work
together to balance these interests while avoiding excessive
government entanglement with religion.
* 2013 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2011) (No. 10553).
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This commentary will examine Hosanna-Tabor in all its
complexity. After providing the factual and legal background,
addressing the appellate court’s decision, and examining the
arguments before the Supreme Court, the commentary will return to
the previously posed hypothetical. This commentary will then
conclude that, fortunately for parochial school teachers, such a
hypothetical world is, at least for now, probably only hypothetical.
II. FACTS
Cheryl Perich, the respondent in the case at hand, began working
for the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School
2
3
(Hosanna-Tabor) in 1999. As a contract teacher, she taught a full
range of academic subjects, including math, science, gym, language
4
arts, social studies, art, and music. She also taught a religion class four
days a week, led her students in prayer three times a day, and led
chapel services approximately twice a year on a rotating basis with
5
the other teachers. In total, Perich spent about forty-five minutes per
6
day on religious activities.
In March of 2000, the Hosanna-Tabor church congregation
7
approved Perich to be a “called” teacher. As a called teacher, she
enjoyed open-ended employment, for-cause termination rights, and
8
the title of “commissioned minister.” Though being called did require
approval from the congregation and some additional religious
9
education, her actual duties remained the same.
Four years later, Perich was hospitalized after becoming ill during
10
a summer church event. Hosanna-Tabor recommended that she take
disability leave for the upcoming academic year, reassuring her that
2. Id. at 772.
3. Contract teachers at Hosanna-Tabor are lay teachers hired by the school board for
one-year renewable terms. Id. Notably, Hosanna-Tabor did not require that its teachers be
Lutheran. Id. at 773. In fact, non-Lutheran teachers had responsibilities identical to Lutheran
teachers, and Hosanna-Tabor has employed at least one non-Lutheran teacher in the past. Id.
4. See id. at 772 (stating that Perich’s duties as a contract teacher and as a called teacher
were identical).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. In contrast, those with the title “ordained minister” worked in the pastoral office
and had the power to “preach the Word and administer the Sacraments.” Brief for Respondent
Cheryl Perich at 4–5, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n, No. 10-553 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2011), 2011 WL 3380507, at *4–5.
10. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 597 F.3d at 773.
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her job would still be there when she returned to good health. After
nearly five months on disability leave, however, the school changed its
tune. When Perich informed the school of her intention to return to
work in February, the school principal expressed doubt that Perich
would be healthy enough to return by then, despite assurances to the
12
contrary from Perich’s doctor. Contemporaneously, the principal
informed Perich that the school board intended to amend the school
handbook, requesting that employees on more than six months
13
disability leave resign their callings. The principal also reported to
the congregation that Perich likely would not be “physically capable”
14
of returning to work that year. In response, the board requested
Perich’s “peaceful resignation” in exchange for covering some of her
15
16
medical expenses. Perich declined.
Controversy erupted on February 22, 2005, the day Perich’s doctor
17
stated she could safely return to work. Perich arrived at the school
ready to resume teaching, but the school had no position available for
18
her. Perich feared that if she did not return to work the first day she
was eligible, the school would construe a provision in the employee
19
handbook to claim that she voluntarily terminated her employment.
Accordingly, she refused to leave until the administration provided
20
written acknowledgement of her presence that day. Instead, the
administration wrote her a letter stating that she provided improper
notice of her return and asking her to remain on disability leave until
21
it could develop a plan to accommodate her. When the school
contacted Perich later that evening to suggest that she probably
would be fired for her “disruptive behavior earlier that day,” Perich
stated that she would resort to legal means to protect herself if they
22
could not come to an agreement.
On March 19, the school sent Perich a letter stating that due to her
“insubordination and disruptive behavior,” the board would request
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 774.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that the congregation rescind her calling at its next voter’s meeting.
The letter also asserted that Perich’s “threat[] to take legal action”
24
had “damaged, beyond repair” her relationship with Hosanna-Tabor.
On March 21, Perich’s counsel informed Hosanna-Tabor that its
25
actions constituted illegal discrimination.
Shortly thereafter,
26
Hosanna-Tabor terminated Perich’s employment. In response,
Perich filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
27
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
On September 28, the EEOC filed a complaint in district court
alleging that Hosanna-Tabor violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). The alleged violation occurred when Hosanna-Tabor
terminated Perich’s employment in retaliation for her threat to take
28
protective legal action against unlawful discrimination. HosannaTabor responded that it terminated Perich’s employment because her
threat to pursue a legal remedy outside of the church’s internal
29
dispute-resolution process contradicted church doctrine. Despite this
claim, Hosanna-Tabor had not mentioned church doctrine or the
church’s dispute-resolution procedures in any of the letters written
30
during the controversy.
Hosanna-Tabor moved for summary judgment on the theory that
the district court had no jurisdiction to hear an employmentdiscrimination claim, the resolution of which would require the court
to rule on matters of church doctrine that are protected by the First
31
Amendment. The district court agreed and barred Perich’s claim
under the ministerial exception, primarily because Perich’s official
32
33
title at the time was “commissioned minister.” Perich appealed.

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 775.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 781 (“Hosanna-Tabor has attempted to reframe the underlying dispute . . . to
the question of whether Perich violated church doctrine by not engaging in internal dispute
resolution.”).
30. Id. at 782.
31. See id. at 775, 781 (“[C]ontrary to Hosanna-Tabor’s assertions, Perich’s claim would
not require the court to analyze any church doctrine.”).
32. See id. (“[T]he district court relied largely on the fact that Hosanna-Tabor gave Perich
the title of commissioned minister and held her out to the world as a minister by bestowing this
title upon her.”).
33. Id. at 775.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act
In general, the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating
34
against their employees on the basis of disability. Its anti-retaliation
provision forbids employers from retaliating against an employee
because that employee opposed or brought a claim against unlawful
35
practices.
The ADA provides two exceptions to its applicability to religious
organizations. It explicitly allows religious organizations to give
preference in employment decisions to members of a particular
religion, and to require all applicants or employees to conform to the
36
religious tenets of the organization. The ADA’s anti-retaliation
provision, however, contains no exemptions for religiously motivated
37
retaliation. Accordingly, it is unclear whether an employer can
lawfully retaliate against an employee who reports a potential ADA
violation when the employer provides a religious reason for
termination.
B. Ministerial Exception
At common law, courts also have provided protections for
religious organizations. The ministerial exception exempts religious
organizations from the application of antidiscrimination laws when
that application might violate the principles of the First Amendment,
38
such as the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause. The
exception ensures that antidiscrimination laws do not force religious
organizations to make employment decisions that might contradict
39
the tenets of their faith. For example, the ministerial exception
would prevent antidiscrimination laws from forcing the Catholic
40
Church to hire female priests.

34. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 2011) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual on the basis of disability . . . .”).
35. § 12203(a).
36. § 12113(d).
37. See § 12203(a) (failing to mention religious motive as an exception).
38. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303–04 (3d Cir. 2006).
39. See id. at 304–07 (“The ministerial exception, as we conceive of it, operates to bar any
claim, the resolution of which would limit a religious institution’s right to select who will
perform particular spiritual functions.”).
40. Cf. id. at 307–08 (applying the ministerial exception to bar a female university
chaplain’s gender discrimination claim).
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This exception is actually a specific application of the
41
constitutional avoidance doctrine, which provides that courts should
interpret statutes so that their application will not risk violating
42
constitutional principles. Thus, the ministerial exception is an
interpretive tool that courts use to limit the construction of statutes
like the ADA in order to avoid potential conflict with the First
43
Amendment. In practice, that means courts will invoke the
ministerial exception to bar lawsuits that risk violating First
Amendment principles, even if after a more careful examination, the
44
lawsuit would not actually violate the First Amendment.
Every circuit to have considered the issue has decided that, at the
very least, applying antidiscrimination laws to the minister-church
45
relationship would violate or risk violating the First Amendment.
But courts also agree that the ministerial exception should not apply
to the lay employees of religious organizations because regulating
those employees does not raise the same entanglement or free
46
exercise concerns. The question is: where do courts draw the line
47
between ministers and lay employees?

41. See Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he ministers
exception is a rule of interpretation, not a constitutional rule . . . .”).
42. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.”).
43. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying the
ministerial exception to avoid the risk of constitutional conflict between the First Amendment
and an antidiscrimination statute).
44. See, e.g., Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507
(1979) (“Accordingly, in the absence of a clear expression of Congress’ intent to bring teachers
in church-operated schools within the jurisdiction of the Board, we decline to construe the Act
in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions
arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.”).
45. Petruska, 462 F.3d at 303–04 (“Every one of our sister circuits to consider the issue has
concluded that application of Title VII to a minister-church relationship would violate—or
would risk violating the First Amendment and, accordingly, has recognized some version of the
ministerial exception.” (citing McClure, 460 F.2d at 560–61; Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of SeventhDay Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1165–67 (4th Cir. 1985); Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed
Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 1993))).
46. See, e.g., Soriano v. Xavier Univ. Corp., 687 F. Supp. 1188, 1189 (S.D. Ohio 1988)
(holding that an age-discrimination suit did not raise free exercise or establishment clause
issues); Grotke v. Canisius High Sch., No. 90-CV-1057S, 1992 WL 535400, at *1, *3 (W.D.N.Y.
Apr. 11, 1992) (allowing suit by a lay teacher at a parochial school).
47. See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006)
(referencing a case that the court believes falls “just across the [ministerial versus lay] line . . . ”).
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In answering this question, most circuits have adopted a
48
functionalist approach that examines the duties of the employee. For
example, one test asks whether the “primary duties consist of
teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a
religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and
49
worship.” Stated differently, the test asks whether the employee’s
position is “important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the
50
church.” If it is, then the ministerial exception will apply. Even
utilizing similar functionalist approaches, circuit courts have reached
different results. For example, the Seventh Circuit held that the
ministerial exception applied to a choir director but not to a piano
51
tuner. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that the faculty and staff of a
religious college were not ministers because they were not
“intermediaries between a church and its congregation,” did not
“attend to the religious needs of the faithful,” and did not “instruct
52
students in the whole of religious doctrine.” According to that circuit,
faculty and staff are not ministers under the ministerial exception
53
simply by being “exemplars of practicing Christians.”
Even if a court finds that an employee’s duties are not primarily
religious and do not bar the lawsuit outright, it must still take care to
avoid judicial inquiry that could violate the First Amendment. The
most common pitfall occurs when a religious employer offers a
54
religious reason for the employment decision. The Supreme Court
48. See The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary Duties
Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1779 (2008) (“Nearly all circuits have adopted the Fourth
Circuit’s articulation of the primary duties test.”).
49. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the
Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1514, 1545 (1979)).
50. Id. at 1168–69 (citing Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Sw. Baptist Seminary, 651
F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981)).
51. See Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1040–41 (affirming the dismissal of an age-discrimination suit
brought by a choir director).
52. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980).
53. Id.; see also Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d
1362, 1370 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that teachers at a religious school were not ministers, even
though the school considered its teachers part of its ministry); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist
Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that teachers and nuns teaching at a
church-operated school were not ministers under the ministerial exception because they
“perform[ed] no sacerdotal functions” and did not “serve as church governors,” even though
they did teach biblical subject matter as part of the academic curriculum).
54. See, e.g., Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1040–41 (“Tomic would argue that the church’s criticism of
his musical choices was a pretext for firing him, that the real reason was his age. The church
would rebut with evidence of what the liturgically proper music is for an Easter Mass and Tomic
might in turn dispute the church’s claim. The court would be asked to resolve a theological
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has held that it is improper for courts to question the “truthfulness or
55
56
validity of religious beliefs.” In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
however, the Supreme Court articulated a burden-shifting scheme
that allows courts to ferret out the real reason for a termination
57
without examining the wisdom of the proffered reason itself. At least
two circuits, and arguably three, have held this test can be applied to a
religious organization’s employment decision without violating the
58
First Amendment.
IV. APPELLATE COURT HOLDING
The Sixth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision to bar the suit
under the ministerial exception and remanded with instructions to
59
rule on the merits of the retaliation claim. The court accepted the
trial judge’s factual findings, but disagreed with the judge’s legal
conclusion that Perich was a minister for the purposes of the
60
ministerial exception. The Sixth Circuit concluded that because
Perich’s duties were identical to her duties as a lay teacher, and lay
teachers at Hosanna-Tabor were not even required to be Lutheran,
61
she was not a minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception.
Further evidence convinced the concurring judges that the ministerial

dispute.”).
55. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Emp’t Div.,
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990)).
56. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
57. Id. at 802; DeMarco, 4. F.3d at 170 (“Under the rule of McDonnell Douglas, when an
employee establishes a prima facie discrimination claim, the burden shifts to the employer to
proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. If the
employer contends that its action was motivated by a reason other than age, the burden of
production then shifts back to the employee to prove that the articulated purpose is mere
pretext for discrimination.” (internal citations omitted)).
58. See DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 170–72 (holding that applying the McDonnell Douglas test to
an employment-discrimination case between a parochial school teacher and the parochial school
would not raise serious First Amendment concerns); Geary v. Visitation of Blessed Virgin Mary
Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that courts can “determine whether the
religious reason stated by [the school] actually motivated the dismissal” without violating the
First Amendment); Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1041 (barring judicial inquiry into a church’s
employment decision after distinguishing the facts in that case from those in DeMarco). But see
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979) (denying the
National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over parochial school teachers, no matter how
religious or secular their duties, because of “the critical and unique role of the teacher in
fulfilling the [religious] mission of a church-operated school”).
59. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 782 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2011).
60. Id. at 780–81.
61. Id.
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exception should not apply to this case: “[T]he school itself did not
envision its teachers as religious leaders, or as occupying ‘ministerial’
62
roles.”
After determining that the ministerial exception did not apply, the
court remanded the case to the district court to answer three main
questions. First, was Perich disabled within the meaning of the
63
ADA? Second, did Perich oppose a practice that was unlawful under
64
the ADA? And third, did Hosanna-Tabor violate the ADA in its
65
treatment of Perich? The court stated that the First Amendment
would not prevent the trial court from inquiring into “whether a
doctrinal basis actually motivated Hosanna-Tabor’s actions” because
“Perich’s claim would not require the court to analyze any church
66
doctrine.”
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner Hosanna-Tabor’s Arguments
Hosanna-Tabor argues that the ministerial exception bars Perich’s
claim for a variety of reasons. First, Hosanna-Tabor frames the
ministerial exception more expansively than the Sixth Circuit by
maintaining that the exception applies to discrimination suits brought
by employees who “perform important religious functions,” rather
than only those employees whose primary duties are religious in
67
nature. The church views the Sixth Circuit’s application of the
primary duties test and corresponding analysis as “mechanistic,”
unable to account for “the concept of an ecclesiastical office,” and
68
“not serv[ing] the purpose[] of the ministerial exception.”
Next, Hosanna-Tabor argues that Perich performed the kind of
important religious functions that merit the application of the
69
ministerial exception. Perich taught religion classes, led worship and
62. Id.
63. Id. at 781.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 782.
66. Id. at 781–82 (citing DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 170–71 (2d Cir.
1993) (utilizing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme to inquire into the actual reason
for a religious employee’s termination without questioning the wisdom or reasonableness of the
proffered reason for that termination)).
67. Brief for the Petitioner at 2, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v.
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, No. 10-553 (U.S. Jun. 13, 2011), 2011 WL 2414707, at *2.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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prayer, held ecclesiastical office as a minister, and was “the primary
70
instrument for communicating the faith to her students.”
Finally, Hosanna-Tabor claims that a failure to apply the
ministerial exception to this case would result in excessive
71
government entanglement with religion for three reasons. First,
Hosanna-Tabor rearticulates its proffered reason for firing her, stating
that she “violated church teaching” by filing a civil action instead of
72
making use of the church’s internal dispute-resolution system.
Second, Hosanna-Tabor emphasizes that it was the church
congregation who found her “unfit for ministry” and chose to
73
terminate her. Finally, Hosanna-Tabor reasons that allowing the
claim to proceed on the merits would necessarily involve courts in
74
religious questions better left for the church to decide. The church
fears that permitting the claim to proceed could result in an order to
employ a teacher whose disruptive behavior makes her unfit to teach
75
its students about Lutheran doctrine. Such state action, it argues, is
76
particularly offensive to the First Amendment.
B. Respondent Perich’s Arguments
In response, Perich argues that neither the ministerial exception
nor the First Amendment should bar her claim. She raises three main
arguments. First, she emphasizes the government’s compelling interest
77
in ending invidious discrimination in employment. This not only
frames the debate as a battle of competing interests rather than
absolute rights, but reminds the Court that a decision barring Perich’s
claim will have the effect of permitting the kind of invidious
discrimination that Congress has sought to eliminate.
Second, Perich argues that the First Amendment does not prevent
the application of generally applicable and religiously neutral
78
antidiscrimination laws to the facts of this case. Perich examines, one
79
80
by one, the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2–3.
Brief for Respondent Cheryl Perich, supra note 9, at 17.
Id. at 20–22.
Id. at 49–57.
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81

right of expressive association. She argues that not one of these
important First Amendment principles is at risk of abrogation in
discrimination suits when the employee in question has functions
82
equivalent to a lay person. If the First Amendment is not at risk of
violation, then the ministerial exception need not and should not
83
apply.
Third, Perich directly attacks Hosanna-Tabor’s definition of the
84
ministerial exception. According to Perich, if the ministerial
exception applied to bar claims from any employee who, according to
the church, served “important religious functions,” then many
teachers, administrative staff, and social workers would be “without
the protection from discrimination and retaliation that Congress
85
intended to afford them.” Furthermore, antidiscrimination laws are
86
not the only laws that would be “unearthed,” according to Perich.
Anti-retaliation provisions in a variety of neutral and generally
applicable laws, varying from minimum wage to health and safety
regulations, would be rendered powerless over religious
87
organizations. As Perich states, “a religious organization . . . has no
88
constitutional entitlement to become a law unto itself.”
C. Federal Respondent’s Arguments in Support of Perich
Speaking for the EEOC, the United States wrote a brief in
support of Perich, making four main arguments. First, the United
States claims that Congress fully intended the anti-retaliation
provision of the ADA to apply to all employers, including religious
89
employers. Second, it states that the only real question is whether
the anti-retaliation provision would be unconstitutional as applied to
90
the facts of this case. According to the United States, because the
First Amendment would not bar a claim on these facts, the anti-

80. Id. at 42–48.
81. Id. at 28–41.
82. Id. at 20–22.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 19–20.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 20.
89. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 10–11, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, No. 10-533 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2011), 2011
WL 3319555, at *10.
90. Id. at 11.
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91

retaliation provision applies. Third, the United States argues that
excepting religious organizations from the anti-retaliation provision
would severely undermine many religiously neutral, generally
applicable laws and is simply not demanded by any part of the
92
Constitution. It concludes that constitutional questions arising from
litigation between religious employers and their employees is “best
resolved on a case-by-case basis” rather than through the “adoption
of the petitioner’s overly broad prophylactic rule” that is “contrary to
this Court’s normal method of as-applied constitutional decision93
making.”
VI. ORAL ARGUMENT
At oral argument, the Court appeared to have differences of
94
opinion over two main questions. First, what is an appropriate way to
determine who is and who is not a minister for the purposes of the
ministerial exception? Second, could a court inquire into the real
reasons for termination without risking violation of the First
Amendment?
95
96
With regard to the first issue, Justices Scalia and Alito seemed
ready to give great deference to the church’s own determination of
who is and who is not a minister. Chief Justice Roberts, however,
appeared to question that idea, wondering how that test would work
with a church that claimed all of its members were ministers of the
97
faith. Other Justices, such as Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor,
pressed Hosanna-Tabor’s counsel for a definition of minister and
hinted that the correct test probably is one that looks to the
98
employee’s duties rather than the employee’s official title.
With regard to the second issue, Justice Alito seemed ready to
conclude that it was impossible to perform any such inquiry without
91. Id.
92. Id. at 14.
93. Id.
94. Transcript of Oral Argument, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch.
v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, No. 10-553 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2011).
95. See id. at 10 (Scalia, J.) (“I think your point is that it’s—it’s none of the business of the
government to decide what the substantial interest of the church is.”).
96. See id. at 15 (Alito, J.) (“But I thought with a lot of deference to the church’s
understanding of whether someone is a minister?”).
97. See id. at 13 (Roberts, C.J.) (“Every one of our adherents stands as a witness to our
beliefs. And that—you know, not every church is hierarchical in 20 terms of different offices.”).
98. See id. at 26 (Ginsburg, J.) (“So, the commission is irrelevant. It’s—it’s her job duties
that count.”).
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99

courts questioning church doctrine. Justice Breyer, alternatively,
suggested a more limited, statutory-based holding whereby the Court
would order the district court to determine whether the ADA’s
100
religious conformity exception applies to this case. Justice Ginsburg
seemed to agree and questioned why the doctrinal rule against filing
101
civil lawsuits for discrimination was not in the employee handbook.
Even Justice Scalia seemed initially confused when counsel for
Hosanna-Tabor suggested a court would be permitted to consider
whether the title of minister was a “sham,” but not whether the
102
proffered reason for termination was mere pretext. Considering that
103
104
105
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor appeared dismissive
of the idea that Perich be prevented her day in court over a question
of jurisdiction, Justice Breyer’s suggestion may predict the Court’s
disposition.
VII. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
A. Analysis
The issue before the Court is whether the ministerial exception
applies to bar Perich’s antidiscrimination suit against Hosanna-Tabor.
Because the ministerial exception is an application of the
constitutional avoidance doctrine, the first question is whether the
application of the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision to the facts of this
case raises a serious risk of violating the First Amendment. If there is
no serious risk of violating the First Amendment, then there is no
need to apply the constitutional avoidance doctrine and, therefore, no
need to apply the ministerial exception. No ministerial exception

99. See id. at 51 (Alito, J.) (“I still don’t see how the—the approach that the Solicitor
General is recognizing—is recommending could—can eliminate the problems involved in
pretext.”).
100. Id. at 18–19.
101. See id. at 21 (Ginsburg, J.) (“But the handbook doesn’t tell her, if you complain to the
EEOC about discrimination, then you will be fired.”).
102. See id. at 12 (Scalia, J.) (“Is a sham different from a pretext?”).
103. See, e.g., id. at 9 (Kennedy, J.) (“But you’re asking for an exemption so these issues
can’t even be tried.”).
104. See, e.g., id. at 23 (Ginsburg, J.) (“Mr. Laycock, you, in order, I think, to dispel the
notion that nothing is permitted, in your reply brief you say there are many suits that could be
brought that would not be inappropriate. . . . But I don’t understand how those would work if
the policy is you’re a minister; if you have quarrels with the church or a co-worker, we have our
own dispute resolution, and you don’t go outside.”).
105. See, e.g., id. at 5 (Sotomayor, J.) (“Under your theory, nothing survives if the
individual is a minister, no claim, private claim.”).
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means that Perich’s claim should be permitted to proceed on the
merits, just as the Sixth Circuit ordered.
Under traditional appellate-level ministerial-exception analysis,
Perich’s claim probably should not raise serious First Amendment
concerns because Perich’s employment fails both the primary duties
test and the important religious duties test endorsed by HosannaTabor in its own brief. Indeed, her primary duties both as a contract
teacher and a called teacher were to teach secular subjects. The Sixth
Circuit may have been mechanistic to tabulate the exact proportion of
the day dedicated to secular activities, but Hosanna-Tabor does not
dispute that the actual time spent on the secular activities far
exceeded the time spent on religious ones. Even the Seventh Circuit,
the defender of the “hands off approach,” has recognized that the
First Amendment did not bar an employment-discrimination suit by a
math teacher who had “minor religious duties” that included “leading
106
the students in prayers and taking them to mass.” With regard to the
important religious duties test, no matter how many times HosannaTabor reiterates that Perich had some religious duties—and no matter
how important it considers those duties—it fails to distinguish
Perich’s duties from those of its lay teachers. The argument that
Perich is a minister because she had important religious duties is not
convincing when, in fact, she had identical duties to lay teachers who
were not required to be Lutheran.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court may have created a categorical
rule barring courts jurisdiction over employment disputes involving
107
parochial school teachers. In National Labor Relations Board v.
108
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the Court used the constitutional
avoidance doctrine to deny the National Labor Relations Board
jurisdiction over parochial school teachers, regardless of how religious
or secular their duties, because “[T]he church-teacher relationship in a
church-operated school differs from the employment relationship in a
109
public or other nonreligious school.” Though Catholic Bishop was
not an antidiscrimination case, such a sweeping rationale would

106. Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006) (analyzing the
holding of DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993), which did not perform a
ministerial-exception analysis specifically, but nonetheless performed a constitutional-avoidance
analysis).
107. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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suggest that serious First Amendment questions are raised in an
employment-discrimination case concerning any parochial school
teacher, regardless of other facts. Furthermore, Catholic Bishop
suggested that mere “inquiry into the good faith of the position
asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to the
school’s religious mission” would be enough to raise serious First
110
Amendment questions. That Hosanna-Tabor claims it fired Perich
for religious reasons would therefore raise even more concerns in the
eyes of the Catholic Bishop Court. And if inquiry itself raises
concerns, then applying the McDonnell Douglas scheme to determine
the actual reason for the termination may itself be barred by the
ministerial exception. As such, there is little doubt that under Catholic
Bishop, the facts of Hosanna-Tabor do raise serious First Amendment
concerns.
Because the Catholic Bishop rationale and the traditional
appellate-level ministerial-exception analysis conflict, it is unclear
whether allowing Perich’s claim to proceed on the merits would raise
a serious First Amendment concern. On the one hand, the broad
language of the Catholic Bishop decision suggests that Perich’s
discrimination suit against Hosanna-Tabor, a parochial school,
categorically raises serious First Amendment concerns. On the other,
Catholic Bishop was decided more than thirty years ago and more
recent appellate-level ministerial-exception analysis suggests that the
ministerial exception should not apply because Perich does not
111
qualify as a minister.
Assuming then, arguendo, that allowing Perich’s claim to proceed
does raise serious First Amendment concerns, the constitutional
avoidance doctrine requires the Court to construe the ADA in a way
that avoids conflict with the First Amendment, unless such a
construction is plainly contrary to Congress’s intent. The second
question then becomes whether Congress expressed a clear intention
110. Id. at 502. But see DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 170–71 (2d Cir. 1993) (distinguishing Catholic
Bishop on the basis that antidiscrimination actions “do not require [the same kind of] extensive
or continuous administrative or judicial intrusion” into church matters that the National Labor
Relations Board does).
111. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362,
1370 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that teachers at a religious school were not ministers, even though
the school considered its teachers part of its ministry); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899
F.2d 1389, 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that teachers and nuns teaching at a churchoperated school were not ministers under the ministerial exception because they “perform[ed]
no sacerdotal functions” and did not “serve as church governors,” even though they did teach
biblical subject matter as part of the academic curriculum).
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to apply the statute at issue to facts like these. Here, it is undisputed
that Congress intended the ADA as a whole to apply to religious
organizations. It is not clear, however, that Congress intended the
statute to apply to scenarios like this one, where strong facts indicate
that the employer’s stated reason for terminating employment is
merely a cover for what was really discrimination on the basis of
disability.
The ADA exempts religious organizations from its application in
only two ways: (1) religious organizations may give preference to
members of their own religion in hiring decisions, and (2) they may
require employees to conform with the tenets of the organization’s
112
faith. As previously discussed, it is unclear whether Congress
intended these two exceptions to apply to the anti-retaliation
provision. By arguing that Perich was fired because her threat to
pursue a legal remedy contradicted Lutheran doctrine, HosannaTabor can make a colorable argument that the statute contemplates
and indeed permits such action under the conformity exception.
Without any clear expression by Congress that the conformity
exception does not apply to the anti-retaliation provision, the Court
could bar Perich’s claim and avoid confronting the underlying First
Amendment conflict that would arise if it allowed her claim to
proceed.
But there is one crippling problem with applying the
constitutional avoidance doctrine at this point in the analysis: the real
reason for firing Perich is in dispute and has not yet been subject to a
finding by a trial court. Whether Perich was terminated because she
was disabled or because she failed to abide by Lutheran doctrine is
critical to determining whether Congress intended the ADA to apply
here. If Hosanna-Tabor fired Perich because she failed to abide by
Lutheran doctrine, then Hosanna-Tabor may terminate Perich under
the religious conformity exception to the ADA. If, however, HosannaTabor’s stated religious justification for the termination is merely a
cover for what was really invidious discrimination on the basis of
disability, then the religious conformity exception does not apply. The
Court would have no choice but to allow Perich’s claim and to
confront the underlying First Amendment conflict. Accordingly, a
factual dispute must first be resolved before any court can evaluate
whether Congress clearly intended the ADA to apply to facts like

112. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12112(a), 12113(d), 12203(a) (West 2011).
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these, even if it intended the ADA to apply to religious organizations
in general. A prudent action would be to remand, instructing the trial
court to apply the McDonnell Douglas test to determine the actual
reason Hosanna-Tabor fired Perich. Once that fact has been
established, the trial court can finish the constitutional-avoidance
analysis and decide whether the ministerial exception bars Perich’s
claim.
B. Likely Disposition
The Supreme Court is likely to affirm the holding of the appellate
court. Affirming would allow the Supreme Court to avoid confronting
the underlying constitutional question. As Justice Breyer stated at
oral argument, Congress foresaw this difficult question arising
whenever the ADA was applied to religious organizations and it
therefore provided a religious conformity exception to the ADA’s
general applicability. On remand, if the trial court finds that the
exception applies, then Perich’s suit would be barred without the
Supreme Court ever addressing the underlying constitutional
question. If the trial court finds the exception does not apply, the
Supreme Court need not grant certiorari again unless it wants to
make a ruling on the ministerial exception or the constitutional
question. Upholding the Sixth Circuit’s decision would also leave
intact the traditional appellate-level ministerial-exception analysis
that the majority of Justices at oral argument seemed to support.
Affirmation, therefore, would represent something less than a
monumental shift in the Court’s jurisprudence, something consistent
113
with what some would describe as a minimalist court.
To be sure, affirming the Sixth Circuit would not be
uncontroversial. Upholding the decision would send the matter back
to the district court to inquire into the actual reason Hosanna-Tabor
fired Perich—without, of course, questioning the wisdom or
reasonableness of church doctrine. This, in effect, would hold that
judicial inquiry into the motives behind religious organizations’
employment decisions to determine whether the ministerial exception
applies does not by itself raise serious First Amendment questions.
114
Such a holding is supported by at least two circuits, but would

113. Jonathan H. Adler, Making Sense of the Supreme Court, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July
2, 2010, 9:58 AM), http://volokh.com/2010/07/02/making-sense-of-the-supreme-court/.
114. See cases cited supra note 58.
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depart from the language in Catholic Bishop, which suggests that such
judicial inquiry would raise serious First Amendment concerns.
Accordingly, it likely would draw a dissent from the conservative
Justices, who at oral argument expressed disfavor for pretextual
115
inquiries.
Reversal, however, would mean the majority of the Court believes
Perich’s claim should be barred, either by application of the
ministerial exception or because allowing Perich’s claim to proceed
would actually violate the First Amendment. If oral argument is any
indication, the Court does not seem to be leaning in this direction.
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kennedy expressed disapproval at
116
the suggestion that Perich’s claims should not be heard.
Furthermore, reversal would require the Court either to formulate its
own ministerial exception or to bar the lawsuit as an actual violation
of the First Amendment. Yet, at oral argument, the Court gave off an
air of paralysis over both the underlying constitutional matter and
how it might formulate a test for determining who is and who is not a
117
minister.
But perhaps most compellingly, if the Court barred Perich’s claim
at this point without first remanding to determine the actual reason
for her termination, it would send a signal that a religious
organization need only claim religious reasons for firing an employee
to avoid liability under religiously neutral and generally applicable
antidiscrimination laws. This not only offends basic notions of fairness
but would, in effect, critically undermine the Fourteenth
118
Amendment’s assurance of equal protection under the law. Indeed,
at oral argument, Justice Sotomayor seized upon this problem by
offering a hypothetical: what about a teacher who is fired by a
119
religious employer for reporting sexual abuse to the government?
Counsel for Hosanna-Tabor reluctantly responded that should a case
like that arise, it would be appropriate for the Court to carve out a
115. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 94, at 22 (Alito, J.) (“Mr. Laycock,
doesn’t this inquiry illustrate the problems that will necessarily occur if you get into a pretext
analysis?”).
116. See supra statements by Justices in notes 103, 104, 105.
117. See generally id.
118. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)
(explaining that pretextual analysis “protects against the invasion of constitutional rights
without commanding undesirable consequences not necessary to the assurance of those rights”);
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1370 (9th Cir.
1986) (“[C]hurches are not—and should not be—above the law.”).
119. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 94, at 5.
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120

child-abuse reporting exception to the ministerial exception. In
doing so, counsel all but conceded the point: not even Hosanna-Tabor
would want to live in the world it seeks to create.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court is likely to affirm the Sixth
Circuit, remanding the case to the trial court and allowing Perich’s
claim to proceed on the merits with the careful instructions of the
Sixth Circuit.

120. Id. at 6.

